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Abstract
We analyze the returns to targeting the Australian, New Zealand,
and South African currencies, through Japanese yen-funded speculation
- with a particular focus on the South African rand, for which the carry
trade is often seen as a source of exchange rate volatility. Targeting the
rand through forward currency speculation produces returns which are as
volatile, but with higher mean, and smaller probability of rare but large
losses, than a buy-and-hold investment in the stock market - which is
stochastically dominated in the second-order sense by the rand-targeting
trade; and generates a larger return-to-volatility ratio than the Australian
and New Zealand dollars - the two most common carry targets. Specula-
tive positions and debt ￿ ows driven by the carry trade cause an exchange
rate process characterized by gradual appreciations punctuated by infre-
quent but potentially large and rapid depreciations. The consequent level
of currency instability is a⁄ected by whether in￿ ows cause overheating,
and how the central bank responds to the associated in￿ ationary pressure.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Background
The forward premium anomaly (i.e. the ￿nding that the forward exchange rate
is a biased predictor of the future spot exchange rate), and associated empirical
failure of the uncovered interest rate parity hypothesis at short horizons, are
well known and documented (Hansen and Hodrick (1980), Fama (1984), Froot
and Thaler (1990), Taylor (1995), Engel (1996), Flood and Rose (2002), Chinn
& Meredith (2004), Chinn (2006)).1 Currencies either trading at a forward dis-
count (resp., premium) or, equivalently, with a favorable (resp., unfavorable)
interest di⁄erential, appreciate (depreciate) on average - though somewhat un-
predictably.2 We draw on recent research which tests the economic signi￿cance
of this empirical regularity by taking the perspective of a currency trader, and
examining the pro￿tability of treating the interest di⁄erential as expected re-
turn, rather than expected currency depreciation, using the currency forward
market - i.e. of exploiting the forward premium anomaly, or short-term devia-
tions from uncovered interest parity (UIP, henceforth).
Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (henceforth, BEKR) (2006)
apply two currency speculation strategies: a "practitioner" or "na￿ve" carry
trade strategy, and a regression-based strategy; each implemented through the
forward foreign exchange market, to ten developed country currencies as well
as a portfolio of these currencies. They report the return properties of each
strategy and ￿nd that each yields very high Sharpe ratios (the ratio of mean
return to volatility of returns), and the returns are not correlated with common
risk factors or monetary variables; but argue that although the returns are
high, transaction costs (measured by bid-ask spreads) and the existence of price
pressure in spot currency markets, will reduce the speculator￿ s pro￿ts to zero.
Two subsequent papers apply the same carry trade strategy to di⁄erent
sets of currencies. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (BER henceforth) (2007)
compare payo⁄s to the carry trade strategy applied to two portfolios. The
￿rst portfolio consists exclusively of developed countries, while the second adds
a set of emerging markets to the ￿rst. Despite far higher transaction costs,
including emerging market targets increases the Sharpe ratio from the carry
trade substantially - and above the US stock market. The carry trade payo⁄s
1The unbiased expectations hypothesis (UEH) states that the forward rate is an unbiased
predictor of the future spot rate. This is equivalent to uncovered interest parity (which states
that the interest rate di⁄erential between two countries is equal to the expected depreciation
of the high-interest currency) under no arbitrage - technically, the equivalence is ensured by
the covered interest parity condition, as explained later in the paper. For an alternative view
suggesting country-speci￿c di⁄erences and partial support for the UEH, see the interesting
contribution of Bansal and Dahlquist (2000). Wesso (1999) provides evidence on the failure
of UEH for the South African rand.
2A currency is at a forward premium (resp., discount) if its forward value, in terms of
another currency, is larger (lower) than its value in terms of the same currency, in the spot
market - i.e. the forward exchange rate is lower (resp., higher) than the spot exchange rate,
if the exchange rate is de￿ned as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency.
2are uncorrelated with stock market returns.3 BER (2008) focus on a subset
of the countries used in the previous study, including developed and emerging
markets. They consider three variations on the carry trade strategy: an equally-
weighted carry portfolio; a currency-speci￿c strategy; and a high-low strategy,
taking a position only in the two currencies with the highest forward premium
and discount. They show that the diversi￿ed portfolio produces a higher Sharpe
ratio, mostly due to reduced volatility.
The South African rand is one of the currencies in BER (2008)￿ s sample.
The returns from individually targeting the South African rand documented
in BER (2008, p. 584, Table 1) are indeed unattractive: the Sharpe ratio is
substantially lower than targeting the Japanese yen or the Swiss franc, which are
widely regarded as lower-yielding but less volatile currencies. The rand-targeting
strategy is also dominated by numerous alternative targets (including the yen),
in the mean-variance sense - i.e. rand-targeting o⁄ers lower mean returns and
higher variance. Hence inclusion of the rand in a carry trade portfolio would be
sub-optimal in the mean-variance optimization sense. The study also reports a
skewness statistic for the Swiss franc-targeting strategy of negative 0.612 (the
lowest in their sample), indicating larger crash risk from investing in the franc
than in the rand or any of the other 23 currencies in the study. (See BER
(2008), p.587.) These ￿ndings are egregiously inconsistent with international
reports indicating that the rand is a common carry trade target, while the
Japanese yen and Swiss franc are common carry funding currencies.4
Targeting portfolios of imperfectly or negatively correlated currencies rather
than individual currencies o⁄ers the bene￿t of diversi￿cation: a reduction in the
variance of returns relative to mean returns, and thus improved Sharpe ratios.
However, it is well known that rationalizing the comparison of investments us-
ing the ￿rst two moments of the distribution of returns, requires that returns
be jointly normally distributed, or investors￿choices can be characterized by
quadratic utility of money functions (Ingersoll (1987), p. 95-97). Quadratic
utility might be an inaccurate representation of traders￿preferences; and the
distribution of returns from the carry trade strategies in BER (2007) and BER
(2008) are not Gaussian. BER (2007, 2008) also rely on the US dollar as funding
currency, and the sample in BER (2007) does not include any currency crisis
period.
1.2 This paper￿ s contribution
We implement the currency speculation strategies in BER (2007) and BER
(2008), plus a regression-based strategy in BEKR (2006), to focus on the returns
3They attribute the high Sharpe ratios of the developed country portfolios to transaction
costs and microstructure frictions, but do not attempt to explain the large Sharpe ratios
associated with the portfolios that include emerging markets.
4See Galati, Heath and McGuire (2007), and Winters (2008). For ￿nancial press reports
re￿ecting international market perceptions, see for example "Yen Rises to 13-Year High as
Investors Exit High-Yield Assets," Bloomberg, 24 October 2008; "South Africa￿ s Rand Posts
Fifth Weekly Advance on Rate Premium," Bloomberg, 26 April 2008; and "Rand Gains on
Bets Carry-Trade Allure to Continue," Bloomberg, 9 November 2010.
3and risk from targeting the rand, as well as the Australian and New Zealand
dollars, which are the two most widely cited carry trade targets (Galati, Heath
and McGuire (2007), Winters (2008)); plus the euro, for perspective. Histor-
ically the low interest rates in Japan make the yen a more natural funding
currency for the carry trade than either the US dollar or the British pound and
we thus use the yen as the funding currency - Japanese interest rates over the
past decade are a better proxy for the recent near-zero interest cost of funding
the carry trade, using post subprime crisis US or UK rates.
We show that targeting the South African rand is historically highly prof-
itable, using either the na￿ve strategy or the regression based strategy - the
most pro￿table target in our sample. The ￿gure below contrasts the cumulative
payo⁄s from targeting the rand with the Australian and New Zealand currencies
as carry targets (unit initial investment, rand payo⁄ on the left hand scale).
Figure 1: Cumulative Payo⁄s from Alternative Carry Targets
CUMRAND: South African rand (left scale)
CUMAUD: Australian dollar; CUMNZD: New Zealand dollar




















Over the same period and at the same frequency, the Johannesburg Secu-
rities Exchange All-Share Index (JSE ALSI, henceforth, which fund managers
￿nd di¢ cult to consistently outperform5) produced lower mean returns, yet
similar variance of returns - resulting in an annualized Sharpe ratio from the
rand targeting carry trade approximately four times larger than the JSE-ALSI.
Moreover, the skewness from rand targeting in our currency speculation strate-
gies is larger than that from a buy-and-hold investment in the JSE - indicating
lower crash risk from the carry than the stock market. The return series are
not Gaussian, so we compare the cumulative mass functions of the carry trade
payo⁄s from the alternative targets to each other, and the rand target to the
South African stock market. The rand targeting currency speculation strategy
comfortably dominates stock market investment in the second-order stochastic
dominance sense - i.e. it is a more attractive investment for any risk-averse
investor, irrespective of the steepness of the indi⁄erence curve representing her
5See Bartens and Hassan (2010) and references therein.
4risk-return tolerance.
We conjecture that a signi￿cant portion of rand foreign exchange turnover
and ￿xed income ￿ ows to South Africa are due to the carry trade, and discuss
the following issues of policy relevance.6 First, high short-term exchange rate
volatility causes carry trade losses; and lower volatility increases the rand￿ s
appeal as a carry trade target. Second, the carry trade a⁄ects ￿xed-income
portfolio ￿ ows, but such ￿ ows will only re￿ ect a portion of total carry trade
activity. Third, the rand being an attractive carry trade target a⁄ects the
exchange rate path, contributing to deviations from long-term fundamentals.
Speci￿cally, we draw on recent literature on currency crashes, the limits to
arbitrage, and slow-moving capital, to argue that being an attractive carry
trade target leads to an exchange rate process for the rand characterized by
gradual appreciations (with small random disturbances around the path) when
the rand turns into an alluring target, punctuated by infrequent but potentially
large and rapid depreciations when for example global risk appetite changes or
the yield di⁄erential turns unattractive, causing carry trade reversals. In￿ ation-
targeting can exacerbate such destabilizing events, if or when carry activity
leads to overheating of the South African economy.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two describes the
data; brie￿ y gives the theoretic background for the source of the pro￿tability
of the carry trade; and explains the currency speculation strategies we imple-
ment, as well as their implications for capital ￿ ows. Section three presents
the results. We compare the mean payo⁄, volatility, Sharpe ratio and skew-
ness of each country-speci￿c target, and discuss the extent to which crash risk
explains the returns from the carry trade. We also use stochastic dominance
6The conjecture is based on necessarily indirect evidence of rand carry trade activity.
Direct and comprehensive evidence of carry trade activity targeting any speci￿c currency is
di¢ cult to obtain reliably. The are many ways to implement the trade, especially through
derivatives, which may be o⁄-balance sheet; reported on-balance sheet positions need not be
related to carry trades; participants in the carry trade include unregulated non-bank ￿nancial
institutions (especially hedge funds and commodity trading advisors); and the rand is heavily
traded o⁄shore. But it is possible to obtain indirect evidence. High correlation between
foreign exchange turnover and the carry-to-risk ratio (the ratio of the interest-rate di⁄erential
to expected exchange rate volatility), which is seen as an ex-ante measure of a currency￿ s carry
appeal, suggests that turnover is related to carry trade implementation - indirect evidence of
carry trade activity. Galati, Heath, and McGuire (2007) report a correlation of 0.36 for
the rand, the third highest in their Bank for International Settlements database. In the
second half of 2010, approximately 72 percent of total turnover in the South African currency
market was attributable to non-residents. Currency derivative transactions (esp. swaps)
far outweighed spot transactions; and the former were linked to non-resident activity in the
domestic bond market. (SARB (2011b).) The evidence from Turkey suggests that hedge
funds and investment banks implementing carry trades are the main swap counterparties.
(IMF (2011).) As of June 2010, portfolio ￿xed-income ￿ows to South Africa were primarily
intermediated through a set of ￿nancial centres comprising Luxembourg, Jersey, Cayman,
British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, Bahamas, and Liechtenstein (IMF (2011)) - jurisdictions
where hedge funds (and o⁄ balance-sheet structured investment vehicles until recently) are
typically domiciled. Interestingly, the largest net ￿ows of yen between 2002 and 2007, were
from Japan to the Caribbean ￿nancial centres, according to Bank for International Settlements
data. (See Galati, Heath, and McGuire (2007).)
5for a distribution-free comparison of rand targetting with the stock market.
Section four contains discussions on the relationship between exchange rate
volatility and the returns from targeting the rand; the interaction between
in￿ ation-targeting monetary policy and speculators￿actions; the implications
of this interaction for exchange rate (in)stability; and a remark on the cost of
foreign exchange reserve accumulation.
2 Data and currency speculation strategies
2.1 Data and spreads
Our data are from Reuters Datastream and cover the period from the 7th of
April 1997 to the 21st of February 2011, corresponding to 725 weekly obser-
vations for each exchange rate series. Details on mnemonics for speci￿c series
are contained in Appendix A. The time frame is approximately 14 years, which
includes the South East Asian currency crisis beginning in the second half of
1997, as well as the sub-prime mortgage crisis beginning in the second half of
2007, both of which had substantially adverse e⁄ects on carry trade positions
held prior to the event. The currencies included are those from: Australia, the
euro area, Japan (the funding currency), New Zealand, and South Africa. All
currencies in our sample are frequently used in the carry trade. (Galati, Heath,
and McGuire (2007), Winters (2008).) The sample includes the two most widely
cited carry trade targets, namely the Australian and New Zealand dollars, which
are also, like the rand, regarded as commodity-driven currencies. The Japanese
yen is used as the funding currency; and the euro is included for comparison
with carry targets.
The data set consists of spot and one-month forward exchange rates, and a
benchmark stock market index for South Africa (ALSI), used to compare the
risk of rand-target with that of a buy-and-hold investment in the stock market.
The exchange rates are expressed in foreign currency units (FCUs) per Japanese
yen.
The data include bid, o⁄er and average prices. A participant in the inter-
dealer market is able to buy and sell currency from a dealer (or, in the absence
of dealers, after placing orders in a limit-order book) at the o⁄er (or ask) and
bid prices, respectively. The use of bid-ask spreads re￿ ects the implementation
costs faced by currency traders and ensures that reported excess returns are not
due to a failure to adjust for transaction costs.7 These spreads are exhibited in
Appendix A. As expected, and consistent with BER (2007), the spreads for de-
veloped economy currencies are generally lower than emerging market currency
spreads.8 We calculate two measures of the spread: one in relative percentage
terms as [100 * log(Ask/Bid)], and the other in absolute terms. South Africa
has a disproportionately large spread of 0.8304 percent. We also observe that
7Note however that Reuters bid-ask spreads may be substantially larger than inter-dealer
spreads (see Lyons (2001) and Lustig and Verdelhan (2009)).
8There is however substantial heterogeneity in spread size across currencies.
6the bid-ask spreads are wider in forward markets than in spot markets. This is
consistent with the ￿ndings in BEKR (2006).
2.2 Currency speculation strategies
Let Sa
t and Sb
t denote the ask and bid spot exchange rates respectively. Let
Fa
t and Fb
t denote ask and bid forward exchange rates, respectively, for forward
contracts maturing at time t+1: The variables St and Ft denote the averages of
Sa
t and Sb
t, and of Fa
t and Fb
t , respectively. We start with a compact treatment
of the theoretic background for the carry trade through the currency forward
market. We then consider four speculation strategies: two versions of the na￿ve
carry trade strategy, and two versions of the regression-based strategy - each
distinguished by how bid-ask spreads are treated.
2.2.1 Theoretic background for the speculation strategies
The well-known UIP hypothesis (we will abstract from bid-ask spreads for the
moment) is that the interest di⁄erential equals expected depreciation, that is,
it ￿ i￿
t = EtSt+1=St; (1)
where it and i￿
t denote domestic and foreign interest rates, respectively, over
one period. In the absence of arbitrage opportunities in the market, the covered
interest parity condition must hold:
it ￿ i￿
t = Ft=St: (2)
The UIP hypothesis is therefore equivalent (in an arbitrage-free market) to a
statement about the forward rate as the expected future spot rate:
Ft = EtSt+1: (3)
Suppose that the target currency is trading at a forward discount (or the
funding currency at a forward premium), Ft > St: From equation 3, this means
that EtSt+1 > St; i.e. the target currency is expected to, and should on aver-
age, depreciate, relative to the funding currency. It does not. Most empirical
evidence shows that currencies at a forward discount (resp., premium) tend to
appreciate (depreciate). Equivalently, high interest rate currencies to appre-
ciate. (Hansen and Hodrick (1980), Fama (1984), Engel (1996), Chinn and
Meredith (2004), Bergman and Hassan (2008).) Target currency appreciation,
St+1 < St; means that Ft > St+1; that is, ex-post, the forward rate for delivery
at time t + 1 is larger than the spot rate at t + 1: The trading implication is
straightforward: if the target currency is at a forward discount, Ft > St, buy
the target currency (sell the funding currency) forward, and sell it (converting
the proceeds back to the funding currency) at the future spot rate; if instead
the target currency is at a forward premium, Ft < St, sell the target currency
(buy the funding currency) forward, and buy it at the future spot rate.
72.2.2 Carry trade without transaction costs
This is the baseline na￿ve carry trade strategy, consisting simply of selling the
currency forward when it is at a forward premium, and buying the currency
forward when it is at a forward discount. Speci￿cally, we sell xt units of the
funding currency forward according to the rule:
xt =
+1 if Ft > St;
￿1 if Ft < St: (4)
When covered interest parity holds (and deviations from covered interest parity
are small and rare - see for example Taylor (1987) and BEKR (2006, p.4 and
Appendix B)), the payo⁄ from this strategy is proportional (but larger due to
fewer transactions) to the more popular understanding of the carry trade, i.e.
borrow the low interest funding currency, convert it to the target currency at
the current spot rate, invest in the high yielding currency, and then convert back
at the future spot rate to repay the short position - bene￿ting from a favorable
yield but facing the exchange rate risk.








To see this, consider the case where Ft > St: The trade consists in using xt units
of the yen to buy xFt units of the target currency, delivered at t+1, which are
sold in the spot market at time t+1 for xFt=St+1: The payo⁄in yen is therefore
as given by equation 5:
Observe that there is zero net investment at time t; and the expected payo⁄
to the speculator is always non-negative if 1=St is a martingale. That is, if
Et (1=St+1) = 1=St; then Etzt+1 = xt (Ft=St ￿ 1), and the non-negativity of
the speculator￿ s expected payo⁄ is ensured by the indicator function de￿ning
the trading strategy in equation 4.
Remark 1 (Capital ￿ows.) The zero net investment at time t means that
there are no capital ￿ows initiated by the speculator at time t. It does not mean
that the implementation of the carry trade through the forward market does not
cause immediate ￿ows in the spot market. It does, but by the counterparty￿ s
hedging, if done through the spot market. The counterparties, which are likely
to include large local banks, take the opposite position to the speculator in the
forward market. Hedging by the counterparty causes an in￿ow at the forward
contract￿ s initial date, and an out￿ow at maturity. Concretely: to hedge the
forward exposure (e.g., short rand/long yen forward), the counterparty borrows
x=(1 + i￿
t) yen at time t, converts this to [x=(1 + i￿
t)]St rand, invests at the
domestic rate it between t and t + 1; and receives x[(1 + it)=(1 + i￿
t)]St rand
at time t+1: Covered interest parity ensures that x[(1 + it)=(1 + i￿
t)]St = xFt:
Hence, the amount x[(1 + it)=(1 + i￿
t)]St is used to meet the forward obligation
to sell xFt rand in exchange for x yen, which are used to repay the principal
and interest on the loan of x=(1 + i￿
t) yen, contracted at time t. The opposite
8set of transactions (and capital ￿ows) would be put in place when the rand is
at a forward premium (i.e. the counterpary is long rand/short yen forward).9
However, carry trade counterparties can also use the derivatives market for their
hedging requirements; and may be based o⁄shore. Hence, portfolio debt ￿ows
to South Africa will only represent a fraction of total carry trade activity ￿
representing rand-targeting implemented through the conventional approach, and
counterparty hedging through the spot markets.
2.2.3 Carry trade with transaction costs
The second version modi￿es the decision rule and payo⁄function of the previous
strategy, to re￿ ect bid-ask spreads in the spot and forward markets. We sell xt
units of the funding currency forward according to the rule:
xt =
+1 if F b
t =Sa
t > 1;




















if xt < 0;
0 if xt = 0:
(7)













t; which follows from Et (1=St+1) =
1=St if the bid-ask spread is stable.
2.2.4 BGT regression based strategy
This strategy draws on a small variation on a regression equation used in Backus,
Gregory and Telmer (BGT, henceforth) (1993)10 (who document the degree of
auto-correlation in the forward premium), to directly forecast the payo⁄ to
selling yen forward from:
Ft ￿ St+1
St+1


















Equation 9 uses the forward premium to project the payo⁄ from selling yen
forward, where b at and b bt are recursive estimates of the coe¢ cients, obtained
9Swap transactions may also be used by the counterparty for the same hedging purposes.
10The equation used in BGT (1993) has St in the denominator of the left-hand side of
equation 8. It is easy to verify that the two equations are nearly equivalent (depending on
the size of a covariance term) if 1=St is a martingale.
9using a a 30-week rolling regression, where the ￿rst estimate is calculated using
the ￿rst 30 data points - so the procedure avoids "look-ahead bias."
The strategy consists of selling (resp., buying) the yen forward when the
payo⁄ predicted by the regression, i.e. b at +b bt ((Ft ￿ St)=St); is positive (resp.,
negative). Speci￿cally, for the BGT strategy without transaction costs, the
speculator follows the rule:
xt =
+1 if Et (Ft=St+1) > 1;
￿1 if Et (Ft=St+1) < 1: (10)
The associated payo⁄ is given by equation 5. Again, the strategy involves zero
net investment; and the expected payo⁄is always non-negative if Et (1=St+1) =
1=St:
2.2.5 BGT regression based strategy with transaction costs
To adjust for the bid-ask spread, the speculator implementing the BGT regres-









































These rules follow from 9, coupled with the assumption that the time t bid-ask
spread is the best predictor of the time t + 1 spread, and from the implication
from the BGT regression that,
Et (1=St+1) =
￿


























and the associated payo⁄ is given by equation 7.
3 Results
3.1 Return and volatility
Tables 1 and 2 report the average yen payo⁄s (reported as weekly rates of re-
turn), standard deviation, and Sharpe ratio from the carry trade and regression
strategies, respectively. The average payo⁄s to the carry trade and BGT strate-
gies "decrease" approximately by between seven to 30 percent, depending on
10the target, when transaction costs are taken into account - except for the euro.
(Of course, the payo⁄s adjusted for the bid-ask spreads are the more realistic
payo⁄s.) Sharpe ratios decrease correspondingly.11 The bid-ask spread can be
large from the viewpoint of the currency trader, particularly when targeting
the rand. We will henceforth focus on, and discuss only the payo⁄s from, the
implementation of strategies that re￿ ect bid-ask spreads.
Table 1: Returns to na￿ve carry trade (weekly)
Before transaction costs After transaction costs
Target Mean % SD % SR Mean % SD % SR
Australia 0:43 2:45 0:177 0:40 2:44 0:164
Euro 0:24 1:85 0:129 0:26 1:68 0:155
New Zealand 0:48 2:51 0:190 0:41 2:51 0:164
South Africa 1:77 4:04 0:437 1:18 3:72 0:316
SD is standard deviation of weekly returns; SR is the Sharpe ratio
Sample period: 03/11/1997 - 21/02/2011
It is clear from Table 1 that the Australian and New Zealand dollars generate
similar mean returns and volatility - and hence similar Sharpe ratios. The euro
produces consistently the lower mean return, and is also the least volatile target,
with the lowest Sharpe ratio - all expected. The returns from speculating on
the rand are the most volatile, with an annualized standard deviation (using the
square root of time) of approximately 27 percent, compared to approximately
18 percent for the Australian and New Zealand dollars. But the average return
for targeting the rand is also far larger, resulting in a Sharpe ratio, at 0.3 for
weekly returns (or 2.2 annualised), approximately twice as large as those from
the two more common carry targets.
The BGT regression based strategies produce a similar general pattern.
Again, targeting the South African rand generates the highest mean payo⁄,
but with the highest standard deviation, and comfortably the largest Sharpe
ratio.
Table 2: Returns to BGT-regression strategy (weekly)
Before transaction costs After transaction costs
Target Mean % SD % SR Mean % SD % SR
Australia 0:28 2:48 0:114 0:28 2:44 0:114
Euro 0:21 1:84 0:116 0:23 1:79 0:129
New Zealand 0:21 2:58 0:083 0:21 2:48 0:083
South Africa 1:60 4:19 0:387 1:06 3:63 0:293
SD is standard deviation of weekly returns; SR is the Sharpe ratio
Sample period: 07/4/1997 - 21/2/2011
11Curiously, the payo⁄ and Sharpe ratio for the Euro increases when transaction costs are
included. The same ￿nding is reported for Germany and the Euro in BEKR (see Table 4 of
BEKR (2006)).
11In brief, the volatility of the rand (measured by standard deviation), al-
though high, is not su¢ ciently large to erode its attractiveness as a currency
speculation target. On the contrary, by the widely used Sharpe ratio as an
informal measure of "risk-adjusted" investment performance, it is a substan-
tially more attractive target than the two other commodity currencies (over the
full sample period), namely the Australian and New Zealand dollars, which are
widely regarded as the two main carry trade targets (Brunnermeier, Nagel, and
Pedersen (2009)).
3.2 Crash risk
The previous section shows that the returns to targeting the South African cur-
rency in the yen-funded carry trade, implemented through the forward market,
remains high once adjusted for the high volatility; and, above all, this volatility
is comparable to a passive diversi￿ed investment in the stock market, as reported
in the next section. But means and standard deviations alone give an incomplete
characterization of the risk to expected reward pro￿le if payo⁄s are not normally
distributed. Appendix B contains histograms, cumulative mass function plots,
and QQ plots, illustrating the sampling payo⁄ distributions of the carry trade
and regression strategies for each target, against the normal distribution. It is
immediately apparent that these distributions are not Gaussian. We perform
the Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro and Wilk (1965)) for each payo⁄series, and ￿nd
(statistically highly signi￿cant) evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the
distributions are Gaussian (see Table 3).
Moreover, risk factors traditionally used to price stock market returns do not
price currency market returns (see Burnside (2011)). A plausible explanation for
the persistence of carry trade returns is the premium required as compensation
for the infrequent occurrence of very large losses.12 The sudden unwinding of
carry trades, due for example to liquidity shortfalls when speculators face fund-
ing constraints, causes the distribution of exchange rates between high and low
interest rate currencies to be negatively skewed, as documented and discussed
in Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009), Farhi and Gabaix (2009), and
Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2011). This negative skew,
an asymmetry in the distribution of exchange rates, represents crash risk in
currency speculation.
12Analysts￿use of the term "volatility" can be imprecise, and we realise that in some cases
the "volatility" attributed to carry trade returns may (vaguely) refer to crash risk, rather than
the second moment of the distribution of returns. This is of course a very loose use of the
term. A tightly managed or ￿xed exchange rate is, by construction, not volatile; but it may
still su⁄er sudden adjustments, or crash.
12Table 3: Skewness and normality
Carry trade BGT regression
Target Skewness SW Skewness SW
Australia ￿0:69 0:897(0:000) ￿0:61 0:891(0:000)
Euro ￿1:03 0:918(0:000) 0:14 0:948(0:001)
New Zealand ￿0:48 0:931(0:000) ￿1:41 0:918(0:000)
South Africa 0:85 0:915(0:000) 1:02 0:862(0:000)
Statistics reported for returns adjusted for bid-ask spreads
SW is the Shapiro-Wilk W test statistic (test signi￿cance in parentheses)
We examine higher order statistical moments. There is clearly crash risk in
the returns to the carry trade strategy we implement. The skewness statistic is
negative for all country-speci￿c targets, except one, and on average. (See Table
3.) However, the relationship between returns and crash risk is not monotonic:
the targets which generate the largest Sharpe ratios are not necessarily the ones
with the most negative skewness. This is consistent with the observations in
Lustig and Verdelhan (2009), who ￿nd that although high interest rates mean
monotonically more skewness against the dollar, the skewness of carry trade
positions (long high-interest, short low-interest currencies) is not systematically
related to returns - the best and worst portfolios generate roughly the same (and
positive) skewness, leading them to conclude that "higher interest rates do not
seem to imply more skewness against the lowest interest rate currencies" (page
9).13
The tentative relationship between carry trade returns and the asymmetry
of the returns distribution largely disappears when we use the BGT regression
strategy to identify the trading signal. There is no pattern in the skewness of
the payo⁄s from the BGT strategy. Table 3 shows that, except for the New
Zealand target, the BGT payo⁄ distributions display skewness values that are
larger (less negative) than those of the carry trade strategy, and positive in two
cases. Positive skewness represents lower downside risk.14
3.3 Carry trade versus the stock market
Our ￿ndings, regarding the attractiveness of the rand as a carry trade target, are
reinforced by comparing the returns from targeting the rand with the returns
from a buy-and-hold investment in the South African stock market through
the JSE ALSI ￿a market capitalisation-weighted index of the shares listed on
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The skewness of stock market returns is
normally used as a benchmark to determine how large is the crash risk in the
13Lustig and Verdelhan (2009)￿ s ￿ndings are more a clari￿cation than a refutation of Brun-
nermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009), who suggest a clear relationship between carry trades
and negative skewness. The latter (i) do not implement carry trade strategies which would
be pursued by speculators; and (ii) their sample only includes developed market currencies,
only two of which are common carry trade targets (the Australian and New Zealand dollars).
14Downside risk is variance below the mean, and the skewness of a symmetrical (e.g. normal)
distribution is zero.
13carry trade. (Lustig and Verdelhan (2009).) Table 4 collects the results for
this comparison. Over the same time period and at the same frequency, the
ALSI rand-denominated return has a standard deviation of 3.12 percent, which
is roughly comparable to (but marginally lower than) our currency speculation
strategies. However, the ALSI￿ s average return was much lower: 0.35 percent.
As a result, the Sharpe ratio from rand-targeting speculation is approximately
three to four times larger than the Sharpe ratio from investing in the stock
market, of 0.11, on weekly returns, which corresponds to an annualized ratio of
0.8 before subtracting the risk-free rate, or 0.5 assuming (modestly) an annual
risk-free rate of 6 percent, compared to 2.2 for the carry trade - a result with non-
trivial implications for the cost of reserve accumulation by the South African
Reserve Bank and the allocation of investment funds in South Africa.15
Table 4: Stock market comparison
Investment Mean % SD % SR Skewness Kurtosis
ALSI (Rand) 0:35 3:12 0:11 ￿0:09 3:64
ALSI (Yen) 0:29 4:43 0:06 ￿0:06 4:82
Rand carry (na￿ve) 1:18 3:72 0:32 0:85 2:64
Rand carry (BGT) 1:06 3:63 0:29 1:02 3:43
SD is standard deviation of weekly returns; SR is the Sharpe ratio
Sample period: 07/4/1997 - 21/2/2011
The attractiveness of the carry trade is even more remarkable when the re-
turns and risk from the investment in the stock market are expressed in yen, to
be consistent with the reported yen-denominated payo⁄s from the carry trade.
The weekly Sharpe ratio from the na￿ve rand-carry is ￿ve times larger than the
yen-denominated ratio for the stock market. The ￿gure below illustrates the
cumulative returns from the rand-targeting strategy (left hand scale) and the
aggregate stock market (right hand scale). The statistics in Table 4 indicate that
the magnitude of weekly gains and losses (i.e. the variance of weekly returns) is
similar to both investments, but the mean weekly payo⁄from the rand-targeting
strategy is substantially higher. Hence the di⁄erence in cumulative returns: a
very respectable three-fold increase through the JSE ALSI, compared to a ter-
minal payo⁄ thirteen times the initial investment through currency speculation
over the same time period.
15When calculating the Sharpe ratio, the risk-free rate is not subtracted from the mean
return to the currency speculation strategies because these are zero net investment positions,
when implemented through the forward markets.
14Figure 2: Cumulative Payo⁄s: Rand Target vs JSE
CUMCARRY: Rand target; CUMJSE: JSE (in yen)


















The larger Sharpe ratios from the rand-targeting carry trade strategies are
not entirely explained by higher crash risk. The skewness from rand-targeting
is (unusually) positive; whilst the skewness from the stock market investment is
negative.16 Again, this result is consistent with Lustig and Verdelhan (2009),
who report lower crash risk from a carry trade portfolio than a buy-and-hold
investment in the US stock market.17 Table 4 also shows the kurtosis for the
carry trade and stock market payo⁄s. Large positive kurtosis re￿ ects the con-
centration of mass in the tails ("fat tails") and centre ("peakedness") of the
distribution. It is clear that the carry trade exposes traders to more extreme
payo⁄s, or large movements up and down, than what would be observed under
a normal distribution, i.e. the payo⁄distributions have fat tails and high peaks,
with less mass in the "shoulders" of the distribution - which is not surprising,
since skewed distributions are always leptokurtic ("fat in the tails") (Wuensch
(2005)). But again, for the South African target, not more so than a passive
investment in the stock market.
Thus, although the currency speculation strategies expose the trader to crash
risk, for the South African case this risk is markedly lower than the crash risk
from buy-and-hold investment in the stock market - which produced a markedly
lower average return. In sum, crash risk only partly explains the returns to the
carry trade; and may be manageable, through less na￿ve strategies. Target-
ing the rand through un-hedged currency speculation produced a return pro￿le
which is as volatile, but with higher mean return, and smaller probability of
rare but large losses, than investing in the stock market.
16Note that the skewness statistic is time-varying, and our results are in￿uenced by con-
centrated periods of exceptionally high returns. A complete answer to this question requires
a closer look at the time series behavior of the crash risk proxy.
17Note that currency portfolio diversi￿cation does not necessarily reduce skewness. See
Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009).
153.4 Stochastic dominance
A natural objection to the preceding arguments may be that the attractiveness
of the rand only applies to investors with a relatively high level of risk toler-
ance, since despite the large Sharpe ratio compared to other carry targets, some
investors may be unwilling to tolerate such a high level of volatility. (Put di⁄er-
ently, the excess return may not o⁄er su¢ cient compensation for the volatility.)
Non-normal distributions of payo⁄s limit the reliability of comparing alterna-
tive investments using mean-variance analysis - and hence the Sharpe ratio.
Speci￿cally, if we cannot assume that traders￿preferences for risk and return
are accurately described by quadratic utility, nor that returns are normally dis-
tributed, mean-variance optimization is di¢ cult to justify on the grounds of
rational expected utility maximization. (See for example Ingersoll (1987).) We
use stochastic dominance to obtain a comparison of alternative payo⁄ distrib-
utions which is valid for any risk-averse trader, irrespective of the slope of her
utility of money function.
Figure 3 below contrasts the cumulative mass functions of the returns from
each target, and permits a clear distribution-free comparison of the rand-target
to a buy-and-hold investment in the South African stock market. It is clear that
the rand-targeting strategy dominates a buy-and-hold investment in the JSE in
the second-order stochastic dominance sense - i.e., it is a superior investment (in
the sense of maximizing expected utility) for any risk-averse trader, irrespective
of the trader￿ s preferences for risk and return, other than requiring a return
premium for taking risks, and irrespective of the distribution of returns.
Figure 3: Cumulative Mass Functions
Carry Trade Targets and JSE-ALSI
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The dominance of rand-targeting does not however apply to alternative cur-
rency targets - less risk-tolerant traders will not necessarily prefer targeting the
rand relative to the Australian and New Zealand dollars. Variations in volatility
and covariance between the returns from the di⁄erent targets will determine the
optimal weight of each target in a carry-trade portfolio.
164 Discussion
4.1 Rand attractiveness as a carry trade target
In South Africa, market analysts have suggested that the attractiveness and thus
role of the carry trade on the rand is "a myth", because the allure of a favorable
interest di⁄erential is easily eroded by the currency￿ s high volatility.18 As a
general statement, this view is false. Targeting the rand using the derivatives
market is (on average) historically pro￿table, despite its high volatility; and
the crash risk is lower (yet the average returns substantially higher) than that
from a buy-and-hold diversi￿ed investment in the stock market, as well as more
common carry targets (Australian and New Zealand dollars).
In contrast, policy analysts have simultaneously recommended "reducing
the carry" and moving towards an exchange rate target band.19 Targeting an
exchange rate band (in addition to other di¢ culties) would lead to limits on the
size of exchange rate losses faced by speculators chasing the yield di⁄erential.
Reducing rand volatility without reducing the interest di⁄erential will increase
further the attractiveness of the rand as a carry trade target. (Speculators
targeting the rand would only incur temporary losses as the rand moves down
in value towards the band.)
4.2 E⁄ect of short-term volatility on carry trade returns
Periods of high volatility, in the currency and ￿nancial markets more gener-
ally (domestic or international), are associated with capital ￿ ow reversals, away
from high-interest/target currencies, and into low-interest/funding currencies.
(Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009)). Such reversals lead to carry trade
losses for speculators who maintain long positions in high-interest currencies,
and short positions in low-interest currencies. Clarida, Davis, and Pedersen
(2009) provide compelling evidence of a strong and systematic inverse relation-
ship between exchange rate volatility and un-hedged carry trade returns.
Our discussion has focused on un-hedged carry trades. Traders can buy cur-
rency options to hedge the exchange rate exposure component (i.e. buy protec-
tion against unfavorable exchange rate movements). When volatility decreases,
the price of these options, and hence the cost of hedging against unfavorable
exchange rate movements, decreases - making the carry trade more attractive,
for a given yield di⁄erential. The policy implication is that interventions to
reduce high-frequency/short-term rand volatility (which could be desirable on
other grounds), would have a perverse e⁄ect: options-hedged targeting will be-
come cheaper; and un-hedged targeting will become less risky. Both forms of
18See for one example, "Blame the carry trade alone? Urban legend with risks", in Mon-
eyweb, 20 November 2009. Regular releases from the international ￿nancial press suggest a
di⁄erent view - see for example "South Africa￿ s Rand Posts Fifth Weekly Advance on Rate
Premium", Bloomberg, 26 April 2008; "Rand Gains on Bets Carry-Trade Allure to Continue,"
Bloomberg, 9 November 2010; "Rand Weakens Versus Euro on Speculation ECB Rate Rise
May Cut Carry Trade", Bloomberg, 4 April 2011.
19See for example " Manage the ￿oat", in the Financial Mail, 1 October 2010, p.37.
17the carry trade would become more attractive.
We estimate rand-yen exchange rate volatility using the GARCH(1,1) model
with a t-distribution for the error term (Bollerslev (1987)), to account for the
excess kurtosis in the distribution of the exchange rate. Figure 4 below shows
that peaks in exchange rate volatility coincide with sharp carry trade losses;
and the period producing the largest and most persistent gains to the speculator
(circa 2002-2003), is accompanied by a sharp decrease in exchange rate volatility.
Figure 4: Rand Carry Returns and Exchange Rate Volatility
CARRY: rand target; VOL: rand-yen rate volatility


















Neverthless, heavy rand-targeting through the currency carry trade can
cause periods of gradual appreciation, possibly beyond "fundamental" value,
punctuated by irregular but fast and large depreciations - leading to medium to
long-term volatility. The next sections explain how.
4.3 The carry trade and currency market instability
4.3.1 Up the stairs, down the elevator
Carry trade activity driving foreign exchange turnover and capital ￿ ows means
the currency under-reacts to positive shocks to the interest di⁄erential in the
short-run. As articulated in Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009), in a
world where traders face liquidity constraints, after an unanticipated increase
in a currency￿ s carry appeal (due to changes in the expected interest di⁄erential
or global risk appetite), the currency will not immediately jump in response
to the textbook ￿ction of instantaneous and unconstrained capital ￿ ows, and
then depreciate to restore UIP. The reason is that keeping liquid capital in
"standby" mode is costly for arbitrageurs in terms of foregone pro￿table op-
portunities. (See Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007), and Acharya, Shin,
and Yorulmazer (2009)). Instead, capital moves gradually, so the currency can
continue in an appreciating trend for a period, occasionally perturbed by de-
preciations as some participants withdraw to "cash-in". This appreciation adds
to the return earned from the interest di⁄erential, attracting further targeting
18or in￿ ows (by carry as well as momentum traders), appreciating the currency
further, possibly leading to currency over-valuation and/or a bubble.
Smart speculators will not necessarily reverse their positions and thus push
the currency towards fundamentals even if they believe the currency is mispriced
(here, overvalued), as long as they believe other traders will continue buying - the
synchronization risk modeled in Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), and the limits
to arbitrage in markets for non-replicable securities (see Barberis and Thaler
(2003), and Gromb and Vayanos (2010) for reviews). Hence, the appreciation
and mispricing can persist for long, though unpredictable, periods of time.
In the absence of news on the target (or funding) currency￿ s fundamentals,
the situation is only reversed when an external shock occurs, or speculators
hit funding constraints - e.g. during currency or/and ￿nancial crises, or other
less extreme periods of market turbulence and increased risk aversion, usually
re￿ ected in the VIX index (implied volatility from US equity market options).
When this occurs however, the carry trade reversal causes an abrupt, potentially
large, and rapid depreciation of the target currency relative to the funding
currency.20 The same synchronization risk and limits to arbitrage may then
keep the exchange rate under-valued for long periods of time.
The consequence is the "up the stairs, down in the elevator" pattern often
observed in exchange rate dynamics, and formalized in Plantin and Shin (2011).
This will be re￿ ected by high volatility over medium to long horizons; but
does not necessarily translate to more short-term volatility, as measured by the
second moment of the distribution.21
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the value of the rand in terms of Japanese yen
over our sample period. Of course that factors other than currency speculation
a⁄ect exchange rate dynamics; but the "up the stairs, down the elevator" pattern
is periodically clear through much of the sample, and especially over the ￿rst
decade of the 21st century.
20The limited availability of standby capital, which delays targeting high-interest currencies
and causes appreciations to be gradual, does not restrict the unwinding of the trade. On the
contrary, margin calls and ￿re sales in extreme cases, can accelerate reversals.
21Some high-frequency volatility may be tolerable, if it limits the rand￿ s allure as a carry
target, helping to keep it closer to its long-term fundamentals-driven path, and reducing the
size of large depreciations when the carry trade is abruptly reversed. That is, high frequency
of relatively small movements up and down in the exchange rate, may reduce the strength and
frequency of more destabilizing episodes caused by rand-targeting, characterized by sustained,
stable and steep appreciations, followed by rapid and aggressive depreciation
19Figure 5: Rand-Yen Exchange Rate (Inverted Scale)
RAND: Yen-value of South African rand











Abrupt reversals of large speculative positions can be destabilizing. The
extent of such destabilizing events, and speci￿cally the magnitude of sudden
depreciations, will depend largely on the monetary policy reaction to overheating
caused by large capital in￿ ows driven by the carry trade.
4.3.2 Connection to monetary policy
If the in￿ ows cause overheating, building in￿ ationary pressure, an in￿ ation-
targeting central bank responds by increasing interest rates. This will increase
the interest di⁄erential if funding currency rates remain unchanged, and attract
further targeting and in￿ ows, appreciating the currency further, creating a cycle.
The depreciation, once the carry trade is reversed, will be larger, and the carry
trade will be destabilizing - because of the central bank￿ s in￿ ation-targeting
response, which would be complementary to speculators￿actions.22
In a number of emerging market economies recently, large carry-related debt
in￿ ows have caused overheating and in￿ ationary pressure. (IMF (2011).) The
monetary authorities of these countries are forced to increase interest rates to
prevent in￿ ation; but in doing so, they further increase the attractiveness of
their currencies as carry targets, attracting more capital in￿ ows23 ￿ a tension
between in￿ ation-targeting and the maintenance of ￿nancial stability.
South Africa experienced large capital in￿ ows in 2010, particularly in the
￿xed-income market. Yet, by early 2011 there were no signs of overheating:
capital in￿ ows reduced bond yields and therefore the cost of capital, but there
was no marked increase in private sector investment; the additional liquidity was
not followed by a marked increase in bank lending; the rate of change in house
prices (which a⁄ect consumption through the wealth e⁄ect) started falling in mid
2010 and turned negative by February 2011; and the appreciation of the currency
22See Plantin and Shin (2011) for a formal treatment.
23This reduces the e⁄ectiveness of measures introduced by the same countries to curb capital
in￿ows.
20helps to dampen in￿ ationary pressures. (Marcus (2011), South African Reserve
Bank (2011a, 2011b).) Hence, capital in￿ ows have not led to overheating; and
the South African Reserve Bank does not need to increase interest rates in order
to subdue in￿ ationary pressures due to (carry trade driven) capital in￿ ows.
(Recent threats to the in￿ ationary outlook stem from international commodity
prices, not capital in￿ ows.)24
4.4 Remark on the cost of reserve accumulation
The stock of foreign exchange reserves held by the South African Reserve Bank,
although low compared to other emerging markets with heavily traded curren-
cies frequently under speculative attack (e.g., major Latin American and South
East Asian economies), has increased steadily over the last decade, from a pre-
carious level of 7.5 billion US dollars in January 2000, to 47 billion by February
2011. The pace of reserve accumulation increased markedly in the more recent
period, with an increase of approximately 20 percent in the twelve months to
February 2011. (See SARB (2011b).)
When accumulating reserves of safe haven currencies, the Reserve Bank is
buying low-yielding currencies. For sterilized interventions, this investment is
￿nanced through the issue of high-interest South African securities - exactly
the opposite of targeting the rand in a carry trade funded by the reserve cur-
rency. That is, the returns to speculators from targeting the rand through the
carry trade are proportional to, and correlated with, the costs to the Reserve
Bank from accumulating reserves of low-interest currencies. In periods of high
returns to currency speculation, the costs of reserve accumulation will be cor-
respondingly high. Financial instruments which synthesize carry trade payo⁄s
may permit a reduction in the cost of reserve accumulation, and/or smoothing
oscillations in the Bank￿ s balance sheet.
5 Conclusion
Academic research has documented the empirical failure of UIP, which is the
source of carry trade pro￿ts, since Hansen and Hodrick (1980) and Fama (1984);
yet the excess returns from this simple currency speculation strategy have in-
creased over the last three decades (Lustig and Verdelhan (2009)). Carry trade
returns drive a non-trivial part of international capital ￿ ows and foreign ex-
change market transactions. Understanding carry trade returns is therefore
important for understanding exchange rate behavior - particularly of very high,
and very low interest rate currencies. The South African rand is a high interest-
rate currency. The returns from targeting the rand (and other indirect evidence)
are consistent with a signi￿cant portion of foreign exchange turnover and ￿xed-
income speculative ￿ ows to South Africa being driven by the carry trade; and
24Indeed, the reversal of the carry trade can be more in￿ationary than the rand-targeting
in￿ows due to the pass-through from the depreciated exchange rate to domestic prices. (See
Aron, Farrell, Muellbauer, and Sinclair (2010).)
21with the weight of speculative non-resident initiated transactions in the foreign
exchange market. Large speculative positions a⁄ect exchange rate dynamics;
and are a⁄ected by changes in the interest-rate di⁄erential. Thus, the interac-
tion between in￿ ation-targeting interest-rate setting, and speculators￿actions,
is an important determinant of exchange rate behavior, and can in￿ uence the
maintenance of macro-￿nancial stability.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: Data mnemonics and bid-ask spreads
Table A1. Data menemonics for weekly data from Datastream
Currency Spot Forward Sample period
Australian dollar BBAUDSP BBAUD1F 07/04/1997-21/02/2011
Euro BBEURSP BBEUR1F 07/04/1997-21/02/2011
Japanese yen BBJPYSP BBJPY1F 07/04/1997-21/02/2011
New Zealand dollar BBNZDSP BBNZD1F 07/04/1997-21/02/2011
South African rand BBZARSP BBZAR1F 07/04/1997-21/02/2011
Notes. Su¢ xes (EB), (EO), and (ER) added to exchange rate mnemonics
give bid, ask (o⁄er), and mid (average) quotes, respectively. Dates are in the
form dd/mm/yyyy. Mnemonic for the South African All Share Index (ALSI) is
JSEOVER~R.
24Table A2. Median bid-ask spreads
100 ￿ ln(Ask=Bid) Foreign currency units
Currency Spot Forward Spot Forward Units
Australian dollar 0.0929 0.1398 0.17 0.2 Cents
Euro 0.0390 0.0554 0.03 0.05 Cents
Japanese yen 0.0554 0.0950 0.06 0.11 Yen
New Zealand dollar 0.1316 0.1743 0.24 0.31 Cents
South African rand 0.6581 0.8029 5 5.2 Cents
Forward denotes the one-month forward exchange rate
7.2 Appendix B: Histograms, cumulative mass functions,
25and QQ plots
B.1. Histograms: Na￿ve carry trade payo⁄s




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.2. Histograms: BGT regression strategy payo⁄s


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26C.1. Cumulative mass functions: na￿ve carry trade payo⁄s
C.2. Cumulative mass functions: BGT regression strategy payo⁄s
27D.1. Q-Q Plots: Na￿ve carry trade payo⁄s
D.2. Q-Q Plots: BGT regression strategy payo⁄s
28Q-Q Plots not falling on the (normal) straight line indicate a non-normal
distribution
29